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Implications of "Correlation and Evaluation"

There is no question of the DCI's responsibility for correlation and evaluation; the primary purpose of the Act of 47 in the intelligence field was to provide such a central mechanism. The Act did not, however, spell out the ways in which the DCI is to carry out this responsibility.

To do the job the DCI needs:

- Independence, to prevent the warping of intelligence by policy objectives.
- Feedback, so he can be aware of policy concerns and actions, and judge the quality of his output.
- Access to all information available to the Federal Government.
- Analytic resources under his control to do the final stage of the job.

Independence. The DCI's independence was recognized in the Act by subordinating him to "the NSC", and the legislative history makes clear that this was intentional. In practice, however, no DCI can be totally independent of the President.

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Feedback. The DCI keeps track of policy through his participation in meetings of the NSC and its subcommittees, and through his access to cable traffic. Theoretically, he receives consumer reaction through NSCIC, created by the Presidential letter of 1971. In fact, his participation in meetings is virtually complete, but his freedom to share what he learns is limited. His access to cable traffic of State and Defense, especially concerning sensitive policy matters, is intermittent and never complete, subject to the moods of HAK and the parochialism of the JCS. Thus in many matters of greatest national concern, national intelligence is not privy to the policy context in which it must assess the capabilities and actions of other states. NSCIC was born moribund and has not improved since.

Access. The Act specified that the DCI was to have access, and indeed the DCI's right to all intelligence held by other agencies has generally been observed. There have been exceptions, however, especially in intelligence contained in Foreign Science reporting, in some NSA materials, and in certain naval matters that mix operations and intelligence. There are implications to the DCI's right of access, however, that go beyond the words of the Act.

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--There is, for instance, intelligence that the DCI believed is needed and that can be collected by existing means if they are properly targeted. Thus he must be able to translate access into requirements, and requirements into tasking of systems to meet these requirements, and he should be able to enforce this taking, in other words to manage collection.

--Finally, there is other intelligence that is required but that cannot be acquired by existing means. This the DCI should be able to develop or stimulate the development of new collection systems and methods.

--The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress clearly intended that the DCI could collect[ion] (under "services of common concern") as well as evaluate, and of course he has done so. In those systems under his control his access is complete. The right to collect, however, does not derive from "correlation and evaluation". The DCI need not collect if he can answer that others do so and can task them.

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Analytic Resources. Along with the DCI the Act created CIA as the instrument through which he would correlate and evaluate. It did not specify whether the staff he used for this purpose would also "produce" or conduct intelligence research. CIA originally took the broader interpretation of its charter, but the Smith-Jackson reorganization of 1950-51 took the narrower. A small group (ONE) was specified as the evaluator, etc. for the DCI, and any other intelligence production that was to be done had to be justified under "services of common concern". ONE's experience over time, however, demonstrated that for the DCI to be independent in his judgments meant that he had to be able to do independent analysis as a check on and as a stimulus to the other intelligence agencies. ONE simply could not argue that a budget-serving service interpretation of events was incorrect without the analytic resources to back up the argument. Moreover, the progression from policy needs to requirements to tasking or to R&D, and the resource decisions which both flow from and control this process, depend on an independent substantive evaluation capability.